Abstract. We describe a means of sharing the DSA signature function, so that two parties can efficiently generate a DSA signature with respect to a given public key but neither can alone. We focus on a certain instantiation that allows a proof of security for concurrent execution in the random oracle model and that is very practical. We also briefly outline a variation that requires more rounds of communication but that allows a proof of security for sequential execution without random oracles.
Introduction
In this paper we present an efficient and provably secure protocol by which alice and bob, each holding a share of a DSA [34] private key, can (and must) interact to generate a DSA signature on a given message with respect to the corresponding public key. As noted in previous work on multiparty DSA signature generation (e.g., [10, 22, 35] ), a shared generation of DSA signatures tends to be more complicated than a shared generation of many other types of ElGamal-based signatures [15] because (i) a shared secret must be inverted, and (ii) a multiplication must be performed on two shared secrets. One can see this difference by comparing a Harn signature [29] with a DSA signature, say, over parameters <g, p, q>, with public/secret key pair <y(= g x mod p), x> and ephemeral public/secret key pair <r(= g k mod p), k>. In a Harn signature, one computes s ← x(h(m)) − kr mod q and returns a signature <r, s>, while for a DSA signature, one computes
and returns a signature <r mod q, s>. Obviously, to compute the DSA signature the ephemeral secret key must be inverted, and the resulting secret value must be multiplied by the secret key. For security, all of these secret values must be shared, and thus inversion and multiplication on shared secrets must be performed. Protocols to perform these operations have tended to be much more complicated than protocols for adding shared secrets. Of course, protocols for generic secure two-party computation (e.g., [49] ) could be used to perform two-party DSA signature generation, but here we explore a more efficient protocol to solve this particular problem. To our knowledge, the protocol we present here is the first practical and provably secure protocol for two-party DSA signature generation. As building blocks it uses a public key encryption scheme with certain useful properties (for which several examples exist) and efficient specialpurpose zero-knowledge proofs. The assumptions under which these building blocks are secure are the assumptions required for security of our protocol. For example, by instantiating our protocol with particular constructions, we can achieve a protocol that is provably secure under the decision composite residuosity assumption (DCRA) [41] and the strong RSA assumption [2] when executed sequentially, or one that is provably secure in the random oracle model [7] under the DCRA and strong RSA assumption, even when arbitrarily many instances of the protocol are run concurrently. The former protocol requires eight messages, while the latter protocol requires only four messages (counting initialization in neither case).
Our interest in two-party DSA signature generation stems from our broader research into techniques by which a device that performs private key operations (signatures or decryptions) in networked applications, and whose local private key is activated with a password or PIN, can be immunized against offline dictionary attacks in case the device is captured [36, 37] . Briefly, we achieve this by involving a remote server in the device's private key computations, essentially sharing the cryptographic computation between the device and the server. Our original work showed how to accomplish this for the case of RSA functions or certain discrete-log-based functions other than DSA, using known techniques for sharing those functions between two parties. The important case of DSA signatures is enabled by the techniques of this paper. Given our practical goals, in this paper we focus on the most efficient (four message, random oracle) version of our protocol, which is quite suitable for use in the context of our system.
Related work
Two-party generation of DSA signatures falls into the category of threshold signatures or, more broadly, threshold cryptography. Early work in the field is due to Boyd [6] , Desmedt [12] , Croft and Harris [8] , Frankel [18] , and Desmedt and Frankel [14] . Work in threshold cryptography for discrete-log based cryptosystems other than DSA is due to Desmedt and Frankel [14] , Hwang [31] , Pedersen [43] , Harn [29] , Park and Kurosawa [42] , Herzberg et al. [30] , Frankel et al. [19] , and Jarecki and Lysyanskaya [32] .
Several works have developed techniques directly for shared generation of DSA signatures. Langford [35] presents threshold DSA schemes ensuring unforgeability against one corrupt player out of n ≥ 3, of t corrupt players out of n for arbitrary t < n under certain restrictions (see below), and of t corrupt players out of n ≥ t 2 + t + 1. Cerecedo et al. [10] and Gennaro et al. [22] present threshold schemes that prevent t corrupt players out of n ≥ 2t + 1 from forging, and thus require a majority of correct players. Both of these works further develop robust solutions, in which the t corrupted players cannot interfere with the other n − t signing a message, provided that stronger conditions on n and t are met (at least n ≥ 3t + 1). However, since we consider the two-party case only, robustness is not a goal here.
The only previous proposal that can implement twoparty generation of DSA signatures is due to Langford [35, Sect. 5 .1], which ensures unforgeability against t corrupt players out of n for an arbitrary t < n. This is achieved, however, by using a trusted center to precompute the ephemeral secret key k for each signature and to share k −1 mod q and k −1 x mod q among the n parties. That is, this solution circumvents the primary difficulties of sharing DSA signatures -inverting a shared secret and multiplying shared secrets, as discussed in Sect. 1 -by using a trusted center. Recognizing the significant drawbacks of a trusted center, Langford extends this solution by replacing the trusted center with three centers (that protect k −1 and k −1 x from any one) [35, Sect. 5 .2], thereby precluding this solution from being used in the two-party case.
Though our motivating application naturally admits a trusted party for initializing the system (see [36] ), our presentation here includes a distributed initialization protocol involving only alice and bob, and no trusted center. Since we are using random oracles in the signature protocol, we will describe an initialization protocol instantiated using random oracles. To achieve provable security, this initialization must be executed in a sequential manner before any signature protocols are executed, even though the signature protocols themselves may be executed concurrently with respect to each other.
Preliminaries
Security parameters. Let κ be the main cryptographic security parameter used for, e.g., hash functions and discrete log group orders; a reasonable value today may be κ = 160. We will also use κ > κ as a secondary security parameter for public key modulus size; reasonable values today may be κ = 1024 or κ = 2048. The value κ is dependent on κ and is set so that known attacks on public key systems with modulus size κ are at least as hard as known attacks on hash functions and other brute-force attacks on systems with main security parameter κ. We assume that an appropriate κ can be computed from κ efficiently.
Signature schemes. A digital signature scheme is a triple (G S , S, V ) of algorithms, the first two being probabilistic, and all running in expected polynomial time. G S takes as input 1 κ and outputs a public key pair (pk, sk), i.e., (pk, sk) ← G S (1 κ ). S takes a message m and a secret key sk as input and outputs a signature σ for m, i.e., σ ← S sk (m). V takes a message m, a public key pk, and a candidate signature σ for m and returns the bit b = 1 if σ is a valid signature for m, and otherwise returns the bit
DSA. The Digital Signature Algorithm [34] was proposed by NIST in April 1991 and in May 1994 was adopted as a standard digital signature scheme in the U.S. [17] . It is a variant of the ElGamal signature scheme [15] and is defined as follows, with κ = 160, κ set to a multiple of 64 between 512 and 1024, inclusive, and hash function h defined as SHA-1 [16] . 1 Let "z selected uniformly at random. Let ≡ q denote equivalence modulo q.
Generate a κ-bit prime q and κ -bit prime p such that q divides p − 1. Then generate an element g of order q in Z * p . The triple <g, p, q> is public. Finally, generate x R ← Z q and y ← g x mod p, and let <g, p, q, x> and <g, p, q, y> be the secret and public keys, respectively. S <g,p,q,x> (m): Generate an ephemeral secret key k R ← Z q and ephemeral public key r ← g k mod p.
Return <r mod q, s> as the signature of m. V <g,p,q,y> (m, <r , s>):
Return 1 if 0 < r < q, 0 < s < q, and
is computed modulo q. Otherwise, return 0.
Zero-knowledge proofs. Our protocols employ a variety of noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [4] . Here we define their security under the random oracle assumption. Our definitions for NIZK proofs are based on definitions from [3] and [13] . Notice, however, that we only require standard soundness, rather than simulation soundness [13] . For a relation R, let L R = {w : (w, v) ∈ R} be the language defined by the relation, and for all w ∈ L R , let W R (w) = {v : (w, v) ∈ R} be the witness set for w. For any NP language L, note that there is a natural witness relation R containing pairs (w, v), where v is the witness for the membership of w in L, and that L R = L. Recall that κ is a security parameter. Let H be the set of all hash functions with κ-bit outputs.
Let X = {X κ } κ≥1 and Y = {Y κ } κ≥1 be two probability distribution ensembles. We define the distinguishing probability of X and Y as (κ) = α | Pr(
We denote by H the set of all functions hash from {0, 1} * to {0, 1} ∞ .
-Zero-knowledge proofs: A noninteractive zeroknowledge proof system with initialization (NIZKPI system) Ψ for an NP language L, with witness relation R, is a tuple (I, P, V, Sim), where I and P are probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, V is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm, and Sim is a probabilistic polynomial-time protocol for performing initialization, answering hash queries and answering P queries, denoted by Siminit, Simhash, and Simprove, 2 respectively, satisfying: 1. Completeness: For all (w, v) ∈ R, for all hash ∈ H, for all I ← I(1 κ ), V hash (I, w, P hash (I, w, v)) returns true. 2 We may assume that Simhash is given a polynomial-size input and a polynomial-size output length, since it obviously could not output an infinite number of bits in polynomial time.
2. Soundness: There is a function Serr(κ, t, n ro ) (soundness error ) such that for all probabilistic adversaries A that run in time t, and make at most n ro hash queries, Pr[Expt A,Ψ (κ)] ≤ Serr(κ, t, n ro ), where experiment Expt A,Ψ (κ) is defined as follows:
If this experiment returns true for a certain σ, we call σ a fraudulent proof. 3. Unbounded statistical zero-knowledge: There is a function Simerr(κ, n ro , n pr ) (simulation error) such that
where the maximum is over all (unbounded time) adversaries A that make at most n ro hash queries and n pr P queries, and where experiments Expt A,Ψ (κ) and Expt A,Ψ (κ) are defined as follows:
where Sim (I, w, v) def = Simprove(I, w) for (w, v) ∈ R. [If (w, v) ∈ R, we may assume that both P hash (I, w, v) and Sim (I, w, v) abort, though we do require that they halt in polynomial time irrespective of whether (w, v) ∈ R.]
In our protocols, we denote a zero-knowledge proof that a predicate P holds on a given input w (i.e., that w is in the language of elements satisfying P ) by zkp [P ]. 3 Encryption schemes. An encryption scheme E is a triple (G E , E, D) of algorithms, the first two being probabilistic, and all running in expected polynomial time. G E takes as input 1 κ and outputs a public key pair (pk, sk), i.e., (pk, sk) ← G E (1 κ ). E takes a public key pk and a message m as input and outputs an encryption c for m; we denote this c ← E pk (m). D takes a ciphertext c and a secret key sk as input and returns either a message m such that c is a valid encryption of m under the corresponding public key, if such an m exists, and otherwise returns an arbitrary value.
We require the encryption scheme we use to be matchable in the following sense: There exists an efficiently computable predicate M (pk, sk) that returns 1 if and only if (pk, sk) could possibly be output from G E (1 κ ). M (pk, sk) implies not only that sk is the matching private key for pk, but also that both are well formed according to the key generation algorithm. For the example cryptosystem we adopt here (described in Sect. 6.1), we describe how to implement a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of sk such that M (pk, sk) holds for a public pk. This proof is required in the initialization protocol for our system (Sect. 4.1).
Our protocol additionally requires that encryption be semantically secure and have a certain additive homomorphic property. For any public key pk output from the G E function, let M pk be the space of possible inputs to E pk and C pk the space of possible outputs of E pk . Then we require that there exist an efficient implementation of an additional function + pk : C pk × C pk → C pk such that (written as an infix operator)
Examples of cryptosystems for which the function + pk exists (with M pk = [−v, v] for a certain value v) are due to Naccache and Stern [38] , Okamoto and Uchiyama [40] , and Paillier [41] . 4 Note that Eq. (1) further implies the existence of an efficient function × pk : C pk × M pk → C pk such that
In addition, in our protocol, a party may be required to generate a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof of a certain predicate P involving decryptions of elements of C pk , among other things. In Sect. 6.1, we show how these proofs can be accomplished if the Paillier cryptosystem is in use. We emphasize, however, that our use of the Paillier cryptosystem is only exemplary; the other cryptosystems cited above could equally well be used with our protocol.
System model. Our system includes two parties, alice and bob. Each must execute an initialization protocol (in a sequential manner) before any signature protocols are executed. After initialization, communication between alice and bob occurs in sessions (or signature protocol runs), one per message that they sign together. alice plays the role of session initiator in our signature protocol. We presume that each message is implicitly labeled with an identifier for the session to which it belongs. Multiple signing sessions can be executed concurrently.
The adversary in our protocol controls the network, inserting and manipulating communication as it chooses. In addition, it takes one of two forms: an alice-compromising adversary that has read access to the private storage of alice and a bob-compromising adversary that has read access to the private storage of bob. Without loss of generality, we assume that an alicecompromising adversary takes the place of alice in interactions with bob, and does so starting from the beginning of system execution. We make the analogous assumption for a bob-compromising adversary.
Informally, the goal of an alice-compromising adversary is to generate a signature on a message that bob did not cooperate to sign, either because he was not asked or because he refused. The goal of a bob-compromising adversary is analagous. Our protocol is secure if it ensures that any correctly signed message was generated with the cooperation of both alice and bob for that message. Our security goals do not include fairness (e.g., if one obtains a signature, then the other must as well) or robustness (e.g., if one misbehaves, then the other can prove this is the case to others).
We note that a proof of security in this two-party system extends to a proof of security in an n-party system in a natural way, assuming the adversary decides which parties to compromise before any session begins. The basic idea is to guess for which pair of parties the adversary forges a signature and focus the simulation proof on those two parties, running all other parties as in the real protocol. The only consequence is a factor of roughly n 2 lost in the reduction argument from the security of the signature scheme.
S-DSA system
In this section we present a new system called S-DSA by which alice and bob can jointly create DSA signatures on messages.
Initialization
Our signature protocol of Sect. 4.2 requires an initialization in which the following properties are achieved: I1. A DSA public key pair is generated (<g, p, q, y>, <g, p, q, x>). I2. The private key x is multiplicatively shared between alice and bob, so that alice holds a random private value x 1 ∈ Z q and bob holds a random private value x 2 ∈ Z q such that x ≡ q x 1 x 2 . Along with y, y 1 = g x 1 mod p and y 2 = g x 2 mod p are public. I3. alice holds the private key sk corresponding to a public encryption key pk, and there is another public encryption key pk for which alice does not know the corresponding sk . Here we assume this initialization is performed by a trusted third party. However, since avoiding a trusted third party is preferable, in Appendix A we describe an initialization protocol for achieving the properties above.
Two comments about properties I2 and I3 are in order. Regarding I2, we use a multiplicative sharing of x to achieve greater efficiency than can be achieved by using either polynomial sharing or additive sharing. With multiplicative sharing of keys, inversion and multiplication of shared keys becomes trivial, but addition of shared keys becomes more complicated. For DSA, however, this approach seems to allow a much more efficient two-party protocol. Regarding I3, it is necessary for our particular zero-knowledge proof constructions described in Sect. 6 that the range of M pk be at least [−q 8 , q 8 ] and the range of M pk be at least [−q 6 , q 6 ], although we believe a slightly tighter analysis would allow both to have a range of [−q 6 , q 6 ].
Signing protocol
The protocol by which alice and bob cooperate to generate signatures with respect to the public key <g, p, q, y> is shown in Fig. 1 . As input to this protocol alice receives the message m to be signed. bob receives no input (but receives m from alice in the first message). At a high level, the protocol is broken into two "phases", each consisting of one message in each direction. The goal of the first phase is to establish an ephemeral private key k ∈ Z q and public key r = g k mod p, where k is shared as k = k 1 k 2 mod q, with k 1 a secret known by alice and k 2 a secret known to bob. In addition, alice commits to (k 1 ) −1 mod q by sending its encryption α under pk and to (k 1 )
−1 x 1 mod q by sending its encryption ζ under pk. In the second phase, bob uses these commitments together with + pk and × pk to form the encryption of the s component of the signature under pk (without ever decrypting α or ζ, which it cannot do).
More specifically, the protocol works as follows. Upon receiving m to sign, alice first computes its share k 1 of the ephemeral private key for this signature, computes
−1 mod q, and encrypts both z 1 and x 1 z 1 mod q under pk. alice's first message to bob consists of m and these ciphertexts, α and ζ. bob performs some simple consistency checks on α and ζ (though he cannot decrypt them, since he does not have sk), generates his share k 2 of the ephemeral private key, and returns his share r 2 = g k 2 mod p of the ephemeral public key. Once alice has received r 2 from bob and performed simple consistency checks on it (e.g., to determine it has order q in Z * p ), she is able to compute the ephemeral public key r = (r 2 ) k 1 mod p, which she sends to bob in the third message of the protocol. alice also sends a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof Π that there are values η 1 (= z 1 ) and η 2 (= x 1 z 1 mod q) that are consistent with r, r 2 , y 1 , α, and ζ and that are in the range [−q 3 , q 3 ]. This last fact is necessary so that bob's subsequent formation of (a ciphertext of) s does not leak information about his private values.
Upon receiving <r, Π>, bob verifies Π and performs additional consistency checks on r. If these pass, then he proceeds to compute a ciphertext µ of the value s (modulo q) for the signature, using the ciphertexts α and ζ received in the first message from alice; the values h(m), z 2 = (k 2 ) −1 mod q, r mod q, and x 2 ; and the special × pk and + pk operators of the encryption scheme. In addition, bob uses + pk to "blind" the plaintext value with a random, large multiple of q. So when alice later decrypts µ, she statistically gains no information about bob's private values. In addition to returning µ, bob computes and returns µ ← E pk (z 2 ) and a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof Π that there are values η 1 (= z 2 ) and η 2 (= x 2 z 2 mod p) consistent with r 2 , y 2 , µ, and µ and that are in the range [−q 3 , q 3 ]. After receiving and checking these values, alice recovers s from µ to complete the signature.
The noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs Π and Π are assumed to satisfy the completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties as defined in Sect. 3. The implementations of Π and Π in Sect. 6 enforce these properties under reasonable assumptions. To instantiate this protocol without random oracles, Π and Π would need to become interactive zero-knowledge protocols. It is not too difficult to construct four-move protocols for Π and Π , and by overlapping some messages, one can reduce the total number of moves in this instantiation of the S-DSA signature protocol to eight. For brevity, we omit the full description of this instantiation.
When the zero-knowledge proofs are implemented using random oracles, we can show that our protocol is secure even when multiple signing instances are executed concurrently. Perhaps the key technical aspect is that we only require proofs of language membership, which can be implemented using random oracles without requiring rewinding in the simulation proof. In particular, we avoid the need for any proofs of knowledge that would require rewinding in knowledge extractors for the simulation proof, even if random oracles are used. The need for rewinding (and, particularly, nested rewinding) causes many proofs of security to fail in the concurrent setting (e.g., [33] ).
Security for S-DSA
In this section we provide a formal proof of security for the S-DSA system. We begin by defining security for signatures and encryption in Sect. 5.1 and for S-DSA in Sect. 5.2. We then state our theorems and proofs in Sect. 5.3.
Security for DSA and encryption
Security for signature schemes. We specify existential unforgeability versus chosen message attacks [28] for a signature scheme S = (G S , S, V ). A forger F is given pk, where (pk, sk) ← G S (1 κ ), and tries to forge signatures with respect to pk. It is allowed to query a signature oracle (with respect to sk) on messages of its choice. It succeeds if after this it can output a valid forgery (m, σ) such that V pk (m, σ) = 1, where m was not one of the messages signed by the signature oracle. We say Succ eu-cma S,κ (F) = Pr(F succeeds), and Succ
(F) , where the maximum is taken over all forgers of time complexity t that make u queries to the signature oracle.
Security for encryption schemes. We specify semantic security [27] . An attacker A is given pk, where
. A generates two equal-length strings X 0 and X 1 and sends these to a test oracle, which chooses b 
Security for S-DSA
Our security definition for S-DSA is similar to our security definition for signature schemes above, except that the signature oracle is replaced by an alice or bob oracle, as described below.
A forger F begins with DSA parameters <g, p, q>, the ability to invoke queries on alice or bob "oracles", and, as described in Sect. 3, entire control of the network between alice and bob. F also receives the public key y, the public shares y 1 of alice and the public share y 2 of bob, and the public keys pk and pk belonging to alice and bob, respectively. An alice-compromising forger also receives x 1 and sk and thus has the ability to faithfully execute the protocol of alice, while a bob-compromising forger also receives x 2 and sk and thus has the ability to faithfully execute the protocol of bob. The goal of F is to forge a signature with respect to <g, p, q, y>. Instead of a signature oracle, there is an alice oracle or a bob oracle.
A bob-compromising F may query alice by invoking aInv1(m), aInv2(r 2 ), or aInv3(<µ, µ , Π >) for input parameters of F's choosing. The queries aInv1(m), aInv2(r 2 ), and aInv3(<µ, µ , Π >) correspond to a request to initiate the protocol of Fig. 1 for message m and the first and second messages received ostensibly from bob in this protocol, respectively. (We assume that these invocations are also accompanied by a session identifier, which is left implicit.) These return outputs of the form <m, α, ζ>, <r, Π> or a signature for the message m from the previous aInv1 query in the same session, respectively, or abort.
The queries bInv1(<m, α, ζ>) and bInv2(<r, Π>) are defined analogously for the bob oracle and can be invoked by an alice-compromising forger.
An alice-compromising forger F succeeds if after invoking the bob oracle as it chooses it can output (m, σ), where V <g,p,q,y> (m, σ) = 1 and m is not one of the messages sent to bob in a bInv1 query. Similarly, a bobcompromising forger F succeeds if after invoking the alice oracle as it chooses it can output (m, σ), where V <g,p,q,y> (m, σ) = 1 and m is not one of the messages sent to alice in an aInv1 query.
Let q alice be the number of aInv1 queries to alice, which we take to be zero for an alice-compromising forger. Let q bob be the number of bInv1 queries; similarly, this is zero for a bob-compromising forger. Let q hash Π denote the number of queries to the random oracle associated with Π, and let q hash Π denote the number of queries to the random oracle associated with Π . We say Succ eu-cma s-dsa,κ (F) = Pr(F succeeds).
Theorems
Here we state theorems and provide proofs that relate the probability with which a forger can break the S-DSA system to the probability that either DSA, the underlying encryption scheme, or the zero-knowledge proofs used in S-DSA can be broken. This implies that if DSA, the underlying encryption scheme, and the zero-knowledge proofs are secure, our system will be secure.
The idea behind each proof is to construct a series of systems s-dsa 0 , s-dsa 1 , . . . , related to s-dsa, with s-dsa 0 = s-dsa, and such that we eventually come to a system s-dsa i such that breaking s-dsa i implies breaking the original DSA signature scheme. We then show that for any attacker, the difference in the advantage of the attacker in breaking s-dsa i−1 and s-dsa i is related to the probability of breaking the underlying encryption scheme or breaking the soundness of the zero-knowledge proof.
In the theorem statement below, let t exp denote the time required for a modular exponentiation with an exponent and modulus of κ bits.
Proof. Let s-dsa 1 be the s-dsa 0 system, except that in response to a bInv2(<r, Π>) query, run Sim to produce a simulated Π . Then
Let s-dsa 2 be the s-dsa 1 system, except that in response to a query bInv2(<r, Π>), set µ ← E pk (0). Note that we still run Sim to produce a simulated Π . Then
To see this, let D be an algorithm that takes a public key pk and a test oracle as input, chooses j R ← {1, . . . , q bob }, and runs s-dsa 1 using pk as the public encryption key of bob, with the following modifications. D computes the first j − 1 ciphertexts by bob under the key pk as normal, i.e., as E pk (z 2 ). D computes the j-th ciphertext using the response from the test oracle with inputs X 0 = 0 and X 1 = z 2 . D computes the remaining ciphertexts as E pk (0). When the simulation completes, D outputs 1 if F produces a forgery and 0 otherwise. Note that the case j = 1 with the test oracle bit equal to 0 corresponds to s-dsa 2 and the case j = q bob with the test oracle bit equal to 1 corresponds to s-dsa 1 . Let D j denote D conditioned on the choice of j and D j,b denote D j conditioned on the bit choice b of the test oracle. Let D j,b denote the simulation run by D j,b . Then, noting that for 1 ≤ j ≤ q bob − 1, D j,1 is perfectly indistinguishable from D j+1,0 , we have
Let s-dsa 3 be the s-dsa 2 system, except that in the initialization, the secret key sk corresponding to public key pk is recorded, and in response to a bInv2(<r, Π>) query, if Π is a fraudulent proof (i.e., a valid proof for a string not satisfying the predicate), s-dsa 3 aborts. (Note that we assume simulating Π has no effect on the soundness of Π. In our instantiations of these protocols, this will be true due to the fact that Π and Π use different random oracles.) Then
Now we show that
To see this, let D be an algorithm that takes a DSA public key <g, p, q, y> generated by G dsa (1 κ ) and its corresponding signature oracle and runs s-dsa 3 with the following modifications. In the initialization, D chooses x 1 R
. In response to a bInv2(<r, Π>) query, D computes µ by choosing c R ← Z q 5 and then setting µ ← E pk (ŝ + qc). Note that the distinguishing probability of D and s-dsa 3 is bounded by 4 q due to the different way µ is computed. While the plaintext would be equivalent modulo q in either case, the multiple of q comes from a slightly different range. In s-dsa 3 , µ would be an encryption ofŝ + qc + qc for some c ∈ [−2q 4 , 2q 4 ] and random c ∈ Z q 5 . Thus the distinguishing probability is bounded by
Theorem 2. Fix a bob-compromising forger F that runs in time t. Then for t = O(t + q alice t exp )
As long as Π is not a fraudulent proof (i.e., a valid proof for a string not satisfying the predicate), this response in s-dsa 2 is exactly the same as the response would be in s-dsa 1 . (Note that we assume simulating Π has no effect on the soundness of Π . In our instantiations of these protocols, this will be true due to the fact that Π and Π use different random oracles.) Then
Let s-dsa 3 be the s-dsa 2 system, except that, in response to an aInv1(m) query, set α ← E pk (0) and ζ ← E pk (0). Note that we still run Sim to produce a simulated Π. Then
To see this, let D be an algorithm that takes a public key pk and a test oracle as input, chooses j R ← {1, . . . , 2q alice }, and runs s-dsa 2 using pk as the public encryption key of alice, with the following modifications. D computes the first j − 1 ciphertexts by alice under the key pk as normal, i.e., as E pk (z 1 ) and E pk (x 1 z 1 mod q). D computes the j-th ciphertext using the response from the test oracle with inputs X 0 = 0 and either X 1 = z 1 if j is odd or X 1 = x 1 z 1 mod q if j is even. D computes the remaining ciphertexts as E pk (0). When the simulation completes, D outputs 1 if F produces a forgery and 0 otherwise. Note that the case j = 1 with the test oracle bit equal to 0 corresponds to s-dsa 3 and the case j = 2q alice with the test oracle bit equal to 1 corresponds to s-dsa 2 . Let D j denote D conditioned on the choice of j and
To see this, let D be an algorithm that takes a DSA public key <g, p, q, y> generated by G dsa (1 κ ) and its corresponding signature oracle and runs s-dsa 3 with the following modifications. In the initialization, D chooses x 2 R ← Z q and computes y 2 ← g x 2 mod p and y 1 ← y 1/x 2 mod p. In response to an aInv2(r 2 ) query (after an aInv1(m) query), D queries the DSA signature oracle with m to get a signature <r,ŝ> and computes r ← g h(m)ŝ −1 yrŝ −1 mod p, whereŝ −1 is computed modulo q. Then in response to an aInv3(<µ, µ , Π >) query, D returns <r,ŝ> (assuming alice would not abort). Note that D produces a view that is perfectly indistinguishable from s-dsa 3 as long as no Π is fraudulent, and we have already added the probability of this to the success probability of the adversary.
6 Proofs Π and Π In this section we provide an example of how alice and bob can efficiently construct and verify the noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs Π and Π of Fig. 1 . The form of these proofs naturally depends on the encryption scheme (G E , E, D), and the particular encryption scheme for which we detail Π and Π here is that due to Paillier [41] . We reiterate, however, that our use of Paillier is merely exemplary, and similar proofs Π and Π can be constructed with other cryptosystems satisfying the required properties (Sect. 3).
We caution the reader that from this point forward, our use of variables is not necessarily consistent with their prior use in the paper; rather, it is necessary to replace certain variables or reuse them for different purposes.
The Paillier cryptosystem
A specific example of a cryptosystem that has the homomorphic properties required for our protocol is the first cryptosystem presented in [41] . It uses the facts that w λ(N ) ≡ N 1 and w Nλ(N ) ≡ N 2 1 for any w ∈ Z * N 2 , where λ(N ) is the Carmichael function of N . Let L be a function that takes input elements from the set {u < N 2 |u ≡ 1 mod N } and returns L(u) = u−1 N . We then define the Paillier encryption scheme (G Pai , E, D) as follows. This definition differs from that in [41] only in that we define the message space M pk for public key pk = <N, g> as M <N,g> = [−(N − 1)/2, (N − 1)/2] (versus Z N in [41] ).
Compute κ , choose random κ /2-bit primes P, Q, set N = P Q, and choose an element g ∈ Z * N 2 such that the order of g is a multiple of N ( [41] ). Return the public key <N, g> and the private key <N, g, λ(N )>.
Select a random x ∈ Z * N and return c = g
Paillier [41] shows that both c λ(N ) mod N 2 and g λ(N ) mod N 2 are elements of the form (1 + N ) d ≡ N 2 1 + dN , and thus the L function can be easily computed for decryption. The security of this cryptosystem relies on the Decision Composite Residuosity Assumption, DCRA.
Note that we must include the initialization of the Paillier keys in the initialization of S-DSA. However, for the purposes of this section, these keys, along with the other parameters p, q in our system, are assumed to be public and fixed, and thus the language L is fixed. That is, the initialization of these parameters is not considered part of the initialization of Π and Π , but simply part of the definition of Π and Π .
Strong RSA
Both Π and Π rely on the Strong RSA problem, defined here. Let G rsa be an RSA modulus generator, i.e., a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input 1 κ , computes κ , and produces a value N = P Q, where P = 2P + 1 and Q = 2Q + 1 are safe primes of length κ /2. Let where the maximum is taken over all adversaries of time complexity at most t.
The initialization I(1 κ ) in each NIZKPI system consists of generatingÑ =PQ, whereP = 2P + 1 andQ = Q + 1 are safe primes of length κ /2, a random h 2 R ← Z * Ñ of orderP Q , a random χ R ← ZP Q , and h 1 ← (h 2 ) χ modÑ . Note that we must include the initialization of these values in the initialization of S-DSA.
Proof Π
In this section we show how to efficiently implement the proof Π in our protocol when the Paillier cryptosystem is used. Π is detailed in Sect. 6.4.
Note that Π uses random oracle hash and Π uses a different random oracle hash . By doing this, it is easy to see that simulations of Π proofs, even on strings not satisfying the predicate, could not be used to construct fraudulent Π proofs. Both hash and hash output elements in Z q .
Verify e = hash(c, Now consider the proof Π. Let p and q be as in a DSA public key, pk = <N, g> a Paillier public key, and sk = <N, g, λ(N )> the corresponding private key, where N > q 6 . For public values c, d, w 1 , w 2 , m 1 , m 2 , we construct a zero-knowledge proof Π of:
The proof is constructed in Fig. 2 , and its verification procedure is given in Fig. 3 . We assume that c, d, w 1 , w 2 ∈ Z * p and are of order q, and that m 1 , m 2 ∈ Z * N 2 . (The prover should verify this if necessary and abort if not true.) We assume the prover knows x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z q and r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z * N such that c
The prover need not know sk, though a malicious prover might.
Intuitively, the proof works as follows. Commitments z 1 and z 2 are made to x 1 and x 2 , respectively, over the RSA modulusÑ , and (using values u 3 and v 4 , respectively) these are proven to fall in the desired range using range proofs as in [20] . Simultaneously, it is shown (using values u 1 and u 2 ) that the commitment z 1 corresponds to the decryption of m 1 and the discrete log of w 1 . Also, simultaneously it is shown (using values y, v 1 , v 2 , and v 3 ) that the commitment z 2 corresponds to the decryption of m 2 and that the discrete log of w 2 is the quotient of the two commitments. The full proof is shown in two columns, the left column used to prove the desired properties of x 1 , w 1 , and m 1 and the right column used to prove the desired properties of x 2 , w 2 , and m 2 . Lemma 1. Π is an NIZKPI for predicate (3), with Simerr Π (κ, n ro , n pr ) ≤ n pr (n ro + 8)2 −κ+1 and Serr Π (κ, t, n ro ) ≤ max{4 82n ro Succ m-rsa,κ (t ), 36n ro 2 −κ+1 }, where t = O(t).
Proof. To be completely specific, we will show that the proof Π is a proof of membership for the language
Recall that p, q, N, g,Ñ, h 1 , h 2 are determined in the initialization, which we assume for now uses a trusted party. Completeness: Follows from inspection. Soundness: Let = Serr Π (κ, t, n ro ), = /4, and assume ≥ 9n ro 2 −κ+1 . Say we are given a Strong RSA instance (Ñ, C) generated byÑ ← G rsa (1 κ ) and
, and output (Ñ, h 1 , h 2 ). Note that Siminit(1 κ ) produces a distribution statistically indistinguishable from I(1 κ ) as long as C is a quadratic residue, which happens with probability 1 4 , and thus Expt A,Π (κ) with this simulated initialization will return true with probability at least . Now consider the following experiment, except with Expt A,Π (κ) using the simulated initialization. Run Expt A,Π (κ) once. Say ω consists of (1) the values determined in initialization and (2) the random tape of A, and hash is the random oracle in this experiment. If the experiment returns true, then let Ind(ω, hash) be the index of the hash query corresponding to the string/proof pair (w, Π) returned by A (or Ind(ω, hash) = ∞ if the pair (w, Π) does not correspond to any hash query made by the A). 5 Let ← Ind(ω, hash). Then we run the experiment again with the same ω and a new random oracle hash * that returns the same answers to all hash queries prior to hash query and random answers to hash query and all subsequent hash queries. If the experiment returns 5 Without loss of generality we may assume that all hash queries are distinct.
true and A returns a pair (w,Π), with Ind(ω, hash * ) = , where the hash returns a different value, then we output a root of C with probability at least 1 2 − 2 −κ according to the algorithm below, and otherwise we abort.
Let break be the probability that the algorithm does not abort. Here we show that Pr(break) ≥ 2( ) 2 /81n ro , which implies we can break Strong RSA in time O(t) and probability at least ( ) 2 /82n ro , assuming κ ≥ 8. Similarly to [45] , let A 
Recall that = Ind(ω, hash). Then with probability at least 1 4 , ∈ I and (ω, hash) ∈ Ω ∩ S . Thus with probability at least δ/4, the first execution is a success, and the adversary will succeed with probability δ/4n ro on the second execution. Let ρ denote the response of hash on query and ρ * the response of hash * on query . The probability that the adversary succeeds on the second execution with ρ = ρ * is
Thus the probability desired above is at least
ro . Now we show how to break Strong RSA with probability at least including u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 as computed in the verification procedure, but the output of the hash function is different, say, e for Π andê forΠ. That is, we get
where e =ê and
Let ∆E = e −ê, Y C Z modÑ, (∆E)/ ζ ). In either case, we would solve the Strong RSA problem. On the other hand, we will show that ζ = ζ = ∆E could occur with probability at most The number of elements χ 1 ∈ Z K in which this equivalence holds is at most K/a + 1, and thus the probability that this holds for a random choice of χ 1 is at most
κ , there is at most a probability of 1 2 + 2 −κ of this equivalence holding, and otherwise we are in the case above with ζ = ∆E. 6 The size of this set depends on χ 0 .
The case where ζ = ζ = ∆E, but ∆E |∆T 1 , is similar. We now show that the case where ζ = ζ = ∆E, ∆E|∆S 1 , and ∆E|∆T 1 could not occur. Note that the assumptions in this case further imply ∆E|∆S 3 , and ∆E|∆T 4 . Then we can extract
Note that x 1 , x 2 , α , δ ∈ M <N,g> , and there must exist
Finally, to extract an x 2 and δ so that t 1 ≡ q ex 2 + δ andt 1 ≡ qê x 2 + δ, note that there exist values x 3 , ρ 3 , , η 1 , η 2 , η 3 ∈ Z q such that
From the second row we can extract η 3 and η 1 . From the third row and the value η 3 , noting that s 1 =ŝ 1 , we can extract x 3 and η 2 . Then we can compute
. Note that we have the following equations, with all values known:
where
Using these equations, we can determine the following facts:
, which implies the result. 2. x 1 ≡ N x 1 and α ≡ N α Proof: similar to the previous fact.
, which implies the result.
But this would contradict our assumption that (
By arguments analogous to those above, we can show that this would contradict our assumpion that ( 
∈ Z * p are of order q and m 1 , m 2 ∈ Z * N 2 , and outputs a valid proof, using the standard technique of "backpatching" random oracle queries. The simulator operates as in Fig. 4 . From inspection, the proof Π is valid (i.e., it verifies).
It is trivial to see that with overwhelming probability this backpatching is consistent, i.e., the random oracle has not been previously queried on the input for which we are backpatching. If the backpatching is inconsistent, we abort. If we only consider the random value y, we see that backpatching can be inconsistent with probability at most n ro /q. Also, the probability of any values
is the same for the real protocol and simulator, the probability of any values s 3 , t 4 ∈ [q 2Ñ , q 3Ñ − q 2Ñ ] is the same for the real protocol and simulator, and the probability of any values s 2 , t 2 , t 3 is the same for the real protocol and the simulator. Thus in total the distinguishing probability (for each simulated proof) is at most
The bound in the lemma comes from the fact that this simulator is called n pr times.
Now we look at the proof Π . Let p and q be as in a DSA public key, pk = <N, g> and sk = <N, g, λ(N )> be a Paillier key pair with N > q 9 , and pk = <N , g > and sk =
We note that Eq. (4) is stronger than what is needed, as shown in Fig. 1 . The proof is constructed in Fig. 5 , and the verification procedure for it is given in Fig. 6 . We assume that c, d, w 1 , w 2 ∈ Z * p and are of order q, and that m 1 ∈ Z * (N ) 2 and m 2 ∈ Z * N 2 . (The prover should verify this if necessary.) We assume the prover knows x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z q , x 3 ∈ Z q 5 , and r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z * N , such that c
The prover need not know sk or sk , though a malicious prover might know sk . We as-
e β mod N t 2 ← eρ 3 + mod q s 3 ← eρ 1 + γ t 3 ← (r 2 ) e µ mod N t 4 ← eρ 2 + ν t 5 ← ex 3 + σ t 6 ← eρ 4 + τ Π ← <z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , y, e, s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 , t 5 , t 6 > and Serr Π (κ, t, n ro ) ≤ max{4 82n ro Succ m-rsa,κ (t ), 36n ro 2 −κ+1 }, where t = O(t).
Recall that p, q, N, g, N , g ,Ñ, h 1 , h 2 are determined in the initialization, which we assume for now uses a trusted party, and that
. Completeness: Follows from inspection. <z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , y, e, s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 
Verify e = hash (c, Fig. 6 . Verification of Π Soundness: Let = Serr Π (κ, t, n ro ), = /4 and assume ≥ 9n ro 2 −κ+1 . Say we are given a Strong RSA instance (Ñ, C) generated byÑ ← G rsa (1 κ ) and
, and output (Ñ, h 1 , h 2 ). Note that Siminit(1 κ ) produces a distribution statistically indistinguishable from I(1 κ ) as long as C is a quadratic residue, which happens with probability 1 4 , and thus Expt A,Π (κ) with this simulated initialization will also return true with probability at least . Now as in Lemma 1, consider the following experiment, except with Expt A,Π (κ) using the simulated initialization. Run Expt A,Π (κ) once. Say ω consists of (1) the values determined in initialization and (2) the random tape of A, and hash is the random oracle in this experiment. If the experiment returns true, then let Ind(ω, hash ) be the index of the hash query corresponding to the string/proof pair (w, Π ) returned by A (or Ind(ω, hash ) = ∞ if the pair (w, Π ) does not correspond to any hash query made by the A). 7 Let ← Ind(ω, hash ). Then we run the experiment again with the same ω and a new random oracle hash * that returns the same answers to all hash queries prior to hash query and random answers to hash query and all subsequent hash queries. If the experiment returns true and A returns a pair (w,Π ), with Ind(ω, hash * ) = , where the hash returns a different value, then we output a root of C with probability at least 1 2 − 2 −κ according to the algorithm below, and otherwise we abort.
Let break be the probability that the algorithm does not abort. As in the proof of Lemma 1, we can show that Pr(break) ≥ 2( ) 2 /81n ro , which implies we can break Strong RSA in time O(t) and with probability at least ( ) 2 /82n ro , assuming κ ≥ 8. Now we show how to break Strong RSA with probability at least Note that the inputs to the hash function for Π andΠ 7 Without loss of generality we may assume that all hash queries are distinct.
are the same, including u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 , v 5 as computed in the verification procedure, but the output of the hash function is different, say, e for Π andê forΠ . That is, we get
Let ∆E = e −ê, ∆S 1 = s 1 −ŝ 1 , ∆S 3 = s 3 −ŝ 3 , ∆T 1 = t 1 −t 1 , ∆T 4 = t 4 −t 4 , ∆T 5 = t 5 −t 5 , ∆T 6 = t 6 −t 6 , and let ζ = gcd(∆S 3 + χ(∆S 1 ), ∆E), ζ = gcd(∆T 4 + χ(∆T 1 ), ∆E), and ζ = gcd(∆T 6 + χ(∆T 5 ), ∆E). If ζ = ∆E, then we can use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute Y and Z such that ((∆S 3 + χ(∆S 1 ))/ζ)Y + ((∆E)/ζ)Z = 1, and output ((z 1 ) Y C Z modÑ, (∆E)/ζ), since
Similarly, if ζ = ∆E, then we can use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute Y and Z such that ((∆T 4 + χ(∆T 1 ))/ζ )Y + ((∆E)/ζ )Z = 1, and output ((z 2 ) Y C Z modÑ, (δE)/ζ ). Similarly, if ζ = ∆E, then we can use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute Y and Z such that ((∆T 6 + χ(∆T 5 ))/ζ )Y + ((∆E)/ζ )Z = 1, and output ((z 3 )
Y C Z modÑ, (δE)/ζ ). In any case, we would solve the Strong RSA problem. On the other hand, we would show that ζ = ζ = ζ = ∆E could occur with probability at most 1 2 + 2 −κ . Consider the case ζ = ζ = ζ = ∆E, but ∆E |∆S 1 . Note that we can write χ = χ 0 + χ 1P Q , and thus ∆S 3 + ∆S 1 χ = ∆S 3 + ∆S 1 χ 0 + ∆S 1 χ 1P Q , with χ 1 randomly chosen uniformly from a set 8 of size K ≥ 2 κ , and unknown to A (even if A had infinite power). Then there is a prime power a b (a ≥ 2) such that a b |∆E and a b−1 |∆S 1 , but a b |∆S 1 . Note that this implies a b−1 |∆S 3 . Now with c 0 = (∆S 3 + ∆S 1 χ 0 )/a b−1 and c 1 = ∆S 1P Q /a b−1 , we have that 0 ≡ a c 0 + c 1 χ 1 , where c 1 ≡ a 0. The number of elements χ 1 ∈ Z K in which this equivalence holds is at most K/a + 1, and thus the probability that this holds for a random choice of χ 1 is at most
κ , there is at most a probability of 1 2 + 2 −κ of this equivalence holding, and otherwise we are in the case above with ζ = ∆E.
The cases where ζ = ζ = ζ = ∆E, but ∆E |∆T 1 or ∆E |∆T 5 are similar.
We now show that the case where ζ = ζ = ζ = ∆E, ∆E|∆S 1 , ∆E|∆T 1 , and ∆E|∆T 5 could not occur. Note that the assumptions in this case further imply ∆E|∆S 3 , ∆E|∆T 4 , and ∆E|∆T 6 . Then we can extract x 1 , ρ 1 , α , γ, where
γ , and moreover, s 1 = ex 1 + α andŝ 1 =êx 1 + α . Also, we can extract x 2 , ρ 2 , δ , ν, where
ν , and moreover, t 1 = ex 2 + δ andt 1 =êx 2 + δ . Finally, we can extract 8 The size of this set depends on χ 0 .
Consequently, again as in the proof of Lemma 1,
, and x 2 ≡ q x 2 , which contradicts our assumption.
Zero-knowledge:
We construct a simulator Sim that takes a string <c, w 1 , d, w 2 , m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 >, where c, w 1 , d, w 2 ∈ Z * p are of order q, m 1 ∈ Z * (N ) 2 , and m 2 , m 3 , m 4 ∈ Z * N 2 , and outputs a valid proof, using the standard technique of "backpatching" random oracle queries. The simulator operates as in Fig. 7 . From inspection, the proof Π is valid (i.e., it verifies).
It is trivial to see that with overwhelming probability this backpatching is consistent, i.e., the random oracle has not been previously queried on the input for which we are backpatching. If the backpatching is inconsistent, we abort. If we only consider the random value y, we see that backpatching can be inconsistent with probability at most n ro /q. Also, the probability of any values s 1 , t 1 ∈ [q 2 , q 3 − q 2 ] is the same for the real protocol and simulator, the probability of any values s 3 , t 4 ∈ [q 2Ñ , q 3Ñ − q 2Ñ ] is the same for the real protocol and simulator, the probability of any value t 5 ∈ [q 6 , q 7 − q 6 ] is the same for the real protocol and simulator, the probability of any value t 6 ∈ [q 6Ñ , q 7Ñ − q 6Ñ ] is the same for the real protocol and simulator, and the probability of any values for s 2 , t 2 , t 3 is the same for the real protocol and the simulator. Thus in total the distinguishing probability is at most
alice bob
In other words, the transcript of P, V y,r (w) can be distinguishied from that of Sim V y,r (w) (w) with probability at most Simerr(κ, t), even when the distinguisher is allowed black-box access to the machine V y,r (w).
We denote a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a value w satisfying a predicate P (i.e., that w is in the language of elements satisfying P ) by zkpk [w : P ].
A.2 Protocol
The protocol for performing initialization, achieving properties I1, I2, and I3 from Sect. 4.1, is shown in Fig. 8 . This protocol takes public DSA parameters <g, p, q> as input and produces public values y, y 1 , and y 2 , with x shared between alice and bob as stated in I2. Though the value y is not mentioned explicitly in Fig. 8 , it is taken as the value published by alice and bob (assum-ing they publish the same value) when each completes the protocol. The protocol is initiated by alice, who generates an encryption key pair (pk, sk) and proves knowledge of sk using proof Π sk . Then bob generates an encryption key pair (pk , sk ) and proves knowledge of sk using proof Π sk . Next, alice generates her secret x 1 and an encryption α of x 1 , and sends α to bob. Analogously, bob generates his secret x 2 and an encryption β of x 2 , and sends β to alice. Finally, alice generates y 1 ≡ p g x 1 and a proof Π 1 that α encrypts the discrete log of y 1 , and sends y 1 and Π 1 to bob. Analogously, bob generates y 2 ≡ p g x 2 and a proof Π 2 that β encrypts the discrete log of y 2 and sends y 2 and Π 2 to alice.
The protocol of Fig. 8 employs interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (Π sk and Π sk ) and noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs of consistency (Π 1 and Π 2 ). These proofs are dependent on the form of sk and sk . If we adopt the Paillier cryptosystem as in Sect. 6, and so pk = <N, g>, alice can prove that N = P Q for primes P and Q by first proving in zero-knowledge that there are primes P, Q and values r, s such that N = P r Q s (e.g., using [21] , [48] , or [25] ), and then proving that gcd(N, λ(N )) = 1 (e.g., using [5] or [25] ). Note that gcd(N, λ(N )) = 1 implies that r = s = 1. In addition, any proof obligations regarding g can be discharged if g is simply set to g = N + 1. Thus, it is not difficult for alice to give a zero-knowledge proof that pk = <N, g> is well formed. Finally, alice can prove knowledge of P and Q using either the protocol of [47] or the more efficient protocol of [46] . The proofs Π 1 and Π 2 can be implemented using straightforward adaptations of the techniques in proofs Π and Π (Sect. 6) and are omitted.
We remind the reader that Π sk and Π sk are interactive proofs of knowledge. By making these interactive (instead of using random oracles to make them noninteractive), we force each party to fix a public key before completing the proof. This facilitates our security simulation (Sect. A.3) by allowing extraction of secret keys for public keys generated according to the correct distribution. The black-box zero-knowledge property of these proofs also facilitates our simulation, as it implies that the simulator for alice (resp. bob) could effectively replace alice (resp. Set pk ← pk * . Simulate Π sk and halt if the simulation fails. Extract sk using the extractor for Π sk and halt if extraction fails. Set α ← E pk (0). Decrypt β to obtain x 2 . Halt if Π 2 is a fraudulent proof. Set y 1 ← y (x 2 ) −1 mod p.
Simulate Π 1 and halt if the simulation fails. Publish y. Output x 2 and sk . Fig. 9 . Simulator for alice initialization bob) in the actual protocol, when running against a given bob-compromising (resp. alice-compromising) adversary.
A.3 Simulatability
For our initialization protocol to be secure, we show that there is an expected polynomial-time simulator 10 for the uncompromised party that takes a DSA key y and public key pk * for the encryption scheme E as input such that the following properties hold: S1.The adversary cannot distinguish the real protocol from the simulated protocol when a random DSA key and a random public key from E are input to the simulator. S2.If the simulated protocol completes successfully, then (a) The public key produced by the protocol is y; (b)The public key of the uncorrupted party is set to pk * ; and (c) The simulator outputs the secret DSA share of the compromised party and the secret key of the encryption scheme of the compromised party. If the initialization protocol is secure in this sense, i.e., there is a simulator with properties S1 and S2, then we can replace the trusted initialization with this initialization protocol. The probability with which the simulator fails to achieve S1 and S2 augments the failure probability of the composite simulation for the resulting signature protocol as an additive term. To state this property carefully, we would also need to change the definition of security for signature schemes (and encryption schemes for bob-compromising adversaries) to consider forgers (attackers) that run in expected time t, rather than strict time t.
The simulator for alice plays the part of alice in the real initialization, except that it performs the operations in Fig. 9 . The simulator for bob plays the part of bob in the real initialization, except that it performs the operations in Fig. 10 .
Extract sk using the extractor for Π sk and halt if extraction fails. Set pk ← pk * . Simulate Π sk and halt if the simulation fails. Decrypt α to obtain x 1 . Set β ← E pk (0). Set y 2 ← y (x 1 ) −1 .
Simulate Π 2 and halt if the simulation fails. Publish y. Output x 1 and sk. Fig. 10 . Simulator for bob initialization Property S2 stated above is obviously satisfied by these simulators. Finally, we must prove that property S1 holds.
Lemma 3. Consider a bob-compromising adversary that runs in time t and completes the initialization protocol with probability ≥ 2Kerr Π sk (κ , t) + Simerr Π sk (κ , t). Then the simulator for alice initialization runs in expected time O(T X (κ ) + t exp ) and can be distinguished from the real initialization protocol with probability at most Simerr Π sk (κ , t) + Serr Π 2 (κ, t, q hash Π 2 ) + Simerr Π 1 (κ, q hash Π 1 , 1) + Adv ss E,κ (t).
be distinguished from I 1 with probability at most Simerr Π sk (κ , t). 3. Let I 3 be the I 2 protocol, except that the simulator decrypts α using sk to obtain x 1 and halts if Π 1 is a fraudulent proof. Then I 3 can be distinguished from I 2 with probability at most Serr Π 1 (κ, t, q hash Π 1 ). 4. Let I 4 be the I 3 protocol, except that the simulator simulates Π 2 and halts if the simulation fails. Then I 4 can be distinguished from I 3 with probability at most Simerr Π 2 (κ, q hash Π 2 , 1). 5. Let I 5 be the I 4 protocol, except that the simulator sets β ← E pk (0). Then I 5 can be distinguished from I 4 with probability at most Adv ss E,κ (t). To see this, take a public key pk and a test oracle, use pk as the public key for bob, and run I 4 except setting β to be the output of the test oracle for pk with inputs x 2 and 0. Note that this is equivalent to I 4 when x 2 is used, and I 5 when 0 is used. 6. Let I 6 be the I 5 protocol, except that y is chosen randomly from {g x mod p} x∈Zq * at the start of the protocol and y 2 ← y (x 1 ) −1 mod p. Then I 6 is perfectly indistinguishable from I 5 . Now I 6 is perfectly indistinguishable from the simulator for bob.
